Electronically Filed
9/18/2019 2:04 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

DAVID and MARGARET FISK,
Husband and Wife,
DOCKET NO. 46639-2018

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
JEFFERY D. MCDONALD, M.D., an
individual; and NORTH IDAHO DAY
SURGERY, LLC., d/b/a NORTHWEST
SPECIALTY HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Respondents,
And
JOHN L. PENNINGS, M.D., an individual

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR
KOOTENAI COUNTY

HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL
District Judge, presiding

Attorneys for Appellants

Attorneys for Respondent,
Jeffery D. McDonald, M.D.

Dennis P. Wilkinson, Esq.
Smith Woolf Anderson
& Wilkinson, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Michael E. Ramsden, Esq.
Nathan S. Ohler, Esq.
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Gary L. Shockey, Esq.
Gary L. Shockey, P. C.
951 W emer Court, Suite 340
Casper, WY 82601

Attorneys for Respondent,
Northwest Specialty Hospital

Deidre Bainbridge, Esq.
P.O. Box 747
Jackson, WY 83001

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF -2

Nancy J. Garret, Esq.
Vala L. Metz, Esq.
Garrett Richardson, PLLC
P.O. Box 1362
Eagle, ID 83616

I.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................3

II.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ..............................................................4

III.

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................5

VI.

ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................6
A. Dr. McDonald has ignored – and therefore conceded – his
responsibility for Jessica Sholtz imposed by I.C. §30-1306 ................................6
B. The Fisks presented abundant evidence that their experts
who criticized Dr. McDonald’s nurse practitioner Sholtz
were familiar with the local standard of care. Other defense
experts, including Dr. McDonald’s agreed. .........................................................9
1. Reiteration of Fisk’s Opening Brief...............................................................9
2. Defense Experts agreed Sholtz acted below the
Standard of Care ............................................................................................10
3. Dr. McDonald and his experts said Sholtz fell below
the Standard of Care.......................................................................................11
4. Conclusion .....................................................................................................11
C. Significant Foundation was presented demonstrating familiarity
with the common-sense Standard of Care ...........................................................11
D. The District Court applied an incorrect standard to the Motion for
Reconsideration....................................................................................................15
1. The Motion for Reconsideration should have been granted. .........................16

VII.

CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................18

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF -3

II.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

LIES

Page

Idaho Rule ofCivil Procedure

I (a)

.......................................................................................

8

Idaho Rule osz'vil Procedure 8(a)(]) ................................................................................... 9
Idaho Rule osz'vil Procedure 59 ..........................................................................................

15,

16

Idaho Rule ofCivil Procedure 60 ..........................................................................................

I5,

I6

Idaho Rule osz'vil Procedure

I5

1 1.2

.......................................................................................

STATUTES
Idaho Code §30-1306 ............................................................................................................ 6,
Idaho Code §6-1013

..............................................................................................................

7, 8

I2, I4,

................................................................................................................................................

I7

Idaho Code §6-1012

14-17

..............................................................................................................

CASE LAW
Clark

Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995

v.

........................................................

8

Rauh

v.

Oliver, 10 Idaho 3, 9, 77 P. 20, 21-22 (1904) ........................................................... 8

Sines

v.

Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 437, 566 P.2d 758, 760 (1977) .............................................. 8

Fox

v.

Stone

Shane

Cosgriff,

........................................

8

Bradshaw, 64 Idaho 152, 157, 128 P.2d 844, 846 (1942) ........................................ 9

v.

v.

Samples

Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 130, 75 P.3d 180, 184 (2003) ............................................... 13

v.

Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 384 P.3d 943, 947 (2016) ............................................. 13, 14

Suhadolnik

Grover

64 Idaho 448, 454, 133 P.2d 930, 932-33 (1943)

v.

v.

Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 117-18, 254 P.3d

Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105 (2002)

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

-4

11, 18-19 (201 1)

......................

13

..........................................................

14

III.

INTRODUCTION
Idaho jurisprudence
improperly dismissed.

What

With the skeletons 0f injured plaintiffs Whose cases were

is littered

Plaintiffs,

who

never get a direct answer from a defendant as t0 exactly

constitutes the local standard 0f care. Defendants

0n conclusory afﬁdavits.

are able t0 rely

standard of care

by discussing

the

Who

Who

Plaintiffs,

are

rewarded for hiding the ball and

are required t0 demonstrate a local

same with a medical community that won’t talk to them.

It’s

an

unfair system resulting in an injustice to those that have been injured at the hands 0f medical

professionals.

Nothing

in the Respondents’

requested 0n appeal.

Oppositions change the Appellants’ right to the relief

The conclusory afﬁdavits

judgment should never have been considered
requirement

is

inherently necessary in

all

relied

on

t0 support their

as they lacked factual

motions for summary

and evidentiary support. This

areas of practice in the State of Idaho, but in the context

0f medical malpractice claims, has been ignored.

The construct allowing medical malpractice defendants

t0 shift the

burden on summary

judgment by ﬁling conclusory afﬁdavits creates an unfair playing ﬁeld resulting
being dismissed.

The same can be

said for the

summary

in Viable claims

dismissals resulting from a plaintiff’s

“inability” to demonstrate expert familiarity With the local standard of care. In this case that should

not be an issue as the plaintiffs adequately and thoroughly presented evidence t0 the district court
that their experts

The

were familiar With the

district court

summary judgment—a
that

more time was not

was

fact

0f care.

critical that the plaintiffs

did not request

more time

picked up and argued by the respondents. There

requested.
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It

is

to

respond t0

a simple reason

was not needed. Voluminous information was provided by

the plaintiffs demonstrating expert

the serious injuries caused

by

knowledge 0f the standard of care.

The

district court

laments

0n an

the respondents t0 Mrs. Fisk only t0 dismiss her case relying

antiquated understanding as t0 the methods a plaintiff can rely 0n t0 demonstrate the local standard

0f care.

The respondents would have

this

Court believe that familiarity with the local standard of

care can only be demonstrated through discussion With a local health care practitioner.

0f the matter, and what
a

number 0f

is at

the heart 0f this case,

different methods.

The respondents’

system geared toward stripping injured
Please

is

plaintiffs

that familiarity

briefs highlight the inherent unfairness

of their

the district court With

truth

can be demonstrated through

0f a

rights.

know that the plaintiffs do not solely rely on arguments that the system is

unfair. In this case, the plaintiffs

The

inherently

complied With requirements dictated by Idaho law and presented

ample evidence demonstrating a knowledge 0f and Violation of the

applicable standard of care.

IV.

ARGUMENT
A. Dr.

McDonald has ignored — and

therefore conceded — his responsibility for Jessica

Sholtz by LC. §30-1306.

There

is

a glaring absence 0f any discussion of LC. §30-1306, in Dr.

McDonald’s

Brief.

That statute mandates responsibility 0f Dr. McDonald for any substandard care rendered by his
employee, Jessica Sholtz. The statute says, in clear terms,

Any

that:

ofﬁcer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation organized under this

remain personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or
wrongﬁJI acts or misconduct committed by him, 0r by any person under his direct
supervision and control, while rendering professional services on behalf of the
act shall

corporation t0 the person for Whom such professional services were being rendered.

To reiterate and re-emphasize facts
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already briefed

by the Fisks,

the McDonald/Sholtz relationship

had the following key aspects, as evidenced by a letter to Sholtz from McDonald:
•

Sholtz was to carry out the duties in a job description. That job description has not yet
been found or produced. In any event, it shows McDonald had control over the details
of Ms. Sholtz’s job duties. The employment letter stated that Ms. Sholtz was to report
directly to Dr. McDonald, just like Section 30-1306 envisions.

•

A “salary” of $100,000.00 was specified.

•

A bonus program was offered.

•

Health, life and dental insurance was provided.

•

There would be eligibility for participation in a 401(k) plan.

•

There were paid holidays and accrued personal time.

•

The relationship was designated as an “at will” employment.

•

McDonald’s professional liability coverage also covered Jessica Sholtz (who had no
separate coverage of her own.)

[Appellants’ Brief, p. 46, with references.]
The list continues:
•

In Ms. Sholtz’s own words, about McDonald: “[h]e is my supervising physician and I
look up to him as a father figure.”

•

Defendant McDonald hired Jessica Sholtz to be a mid-level provider in his practice.

•

A mid-level provider was either a nurse practitioner or a physician’s assistant.

•

Defendant McDonald “never envisioned a mid-level provider as practicing
independently in my practice.”

•

“For the most part, the mid-level provider and myself work side by side, physically in
each other’s presence . . . . So, we are in clinic together.” McDonald goes on to explain
other aspects of the close relationship with Jessica Sholtz.

•

McDonald signed off on all of Sholtz’s orders because he was responsible for her
actions. He signed all orders that came from Sholtz.

[R. 1996; Appellants’ Brief, p. 47, with references.]
Dr. McDonald cannot escape his responsibility for the wrongs of Jessica Sholtz. He has
stated he would have performed differently had he been informed of Ms. Fisk’s condition. Dr.
McDonald’s ignorance of the events in his absence is no excuse from his responsibility for his
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employee Jessica Sholtz, a “person under

his direct supervision

and control, while rendering

whom

professional services 0n behalf 0f the corporation t0 the person for

services

were being rendered.” 30-1306,

supra.

false ignorance for counsel for Dr.

It is

McDonald

position that Dr.

McDonald’s counsel

is

McDonald to

assert a lack

of awareness ofthe Fisk’s

responsible for what Jessica Sholtz did or didn’t d0.

top—notch, highly skilled and well versed in the law.

is

such professional

assert surprise that the Fisks hold Dr.

McDonald

It is

Dr.

disingenuous t0

responsible for Sholtz. Coupled With this false

ignorance by counsel, the Trial Court ignored the law

—

Section 30-1306, supra, in

its

failure t0

enforce Dr. McDonald’s legal responsibilities.

The negligence and substandard care by Jessica Sholtz
Dr.

this matter.

[McDonald

McDonald’s claims

Brief, pp. 18

—

is

well documented in the ﬁlings in

that the Fisks’ experts did not satisfy statutory requirements

21] are not convincing.

The following

section 0f this

Reply notes the

afﬁrmative evidence of Sholtz’s negligence and the Fisk experts’ demonstration of familiarity with
standards 0f care.

It

then highlights portions of Defendant Northwest Specialty Hospital’s ﬁlings

evidencing Jessica Sholtz’s substandard care.

An
related to

is

insistence that the Fisk Plaintiffs

needed to plead what

is,

effectively, a statutory rule

Who is responsible for negligence — not a statute which creates a separate cause 0f action,

ill-founded and “old” thinking.

The following

quotation,

from Clark

v.

Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,

325, 715 P. 2d 993, 995, illustrates this View:

We begin our discussion by noting that technical rules 0f pleading have long been
abandoned

in this state.

Rauh

v.

Oliver,

10 Idaho

3, 9,

77 P. 20, 21—22 (I904). The
is t0 provide every litigant

general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure

With his or her day in court. Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 437, 566 P.2d 758, 760
(1977). The rules are t0 be construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination 0f every action 0r proceeding. I.R.C.P.

complaint

is

t0

1(a).

The purpose 0f a

inform the defendant 0f the material facts upon which the plaintiff

bases his action.

Fox v.
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Cosgriﬁ’,

64 Idaho 448, 454, 133 P.2d 930, 932—33 (1943).

A

complaint need only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the

cause of action and a

demand

for relief. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1); Stone

v.

Bradshaw, 64

Idaho 152, 157, 128 P.2d 844, 846 (1942).

The Complaint adequately notiﬁed Dr. McDonald’s
responsible along With Jessica Sholtz.
21, 25, 26, and 27].

were monitoring Ms.
Fisk’s

condition

explicit [R.

B.

2:15

at

recommendation for

[See, e.g., Complaint, R. pp. 17

Those allegations were
Fisk, that neither

a.m.,

and

transfer out 0f

1897 — 191

1]

was

skilled attorneys that

that both Dr.

saw her
that

NWSH. A

failed

motion

t0

27, paragraphs

McDonald and

personally, that both

Sholtz

—

t0

t0

Jessica Sholtz

were aware 0f Ms.

follow

amend

he was

consultant’s

a

make

it

even more

denied.

The Fisks presented abundant evidence that their experts Who criticized Dr.
McDonald’s Nurse Practitioner Sholtz were familiar with the Local Standard 0f Care.
Other defense experts, including Dr. McDonald, agreed.
1.

Reiteration of Fisk’s Opening Brief.

There

are,

pursuant to decisions 0f this Court cited by

all parties,

multiple mechanisms

available to plaintiffs’ experts to establish familiarity With the local standard 0f care.

Short 0f

having a local physician, nurse practitioner, or nurse say magic words such as “I practice in the
locality, I

know

its

standards 0f care, and the defendant’s acts were substandard

.

.

.,

“the Fisks

presented abundant, admissible evidence that their experts were familiar with local standards.

It

would be redundant

Court in their Opening Brief.

t0 reiterate all the evidence the Fisks

have already presented

to the

The evidence presented by professor/Doctor of Nursing Vernon

Kubiak, nurse practitioner Suzanne Nebeker, and hospital administrator Timothy Hawkins has

been discussed extensively and meticulously documented in the Opening

Brief, speciﬁcally at

pages 11 — 22 and 23 — 29. Suzanne Nebeker even satisﬁed a purported requirement of talking to
local practitioners to

conﬁrm her understanding of the local standard as
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applied to nurses and nurse

practitioner Sholtz.

2.

Defense Experts Agreed Sholtz Acted Below the Standard.

Plaintiffs/Appellants’ submissions

and

that nurse practitioner Sholtz fell

Specialty Hospital,

following

is

NWSH,

were not the only evidence establishing

local standards

below those standards. Multiple submissions by Northwest

The

demonstrated the local standard and Sholtz’s Violations.

a summary, not meant t0 be fully comprehensive:

A. Rick Rasmussen,

CEO, NWSH,

stated in his designation of expert testimony, R.

657 — 66 1 stated that he was familiar With the local standards of care and that nurse
,

practitioner Sholtz violated those standards

by not contacting a

physician, failing t0 go personally to the hospital to treat

transferring

B. Dr.

Emery

Ms. Fisk

t0

Ms.

critical

Fisk,

care

and not

Kootenai Medical Center.

C. Douville, detailed in his expert designation [R. p. 536] that he had an

unfavorable opinion ofnurse practitioner Sholtz, that she was not physically present
t0

examine Ms. Fisk,

NWSH nurses,
Ms.

and

that she did not

respond properly t0 information provided by

that she did not contact her supervising physician concerning

Fisk.

C. Annette Asper, Doctor 0f Nursing Practice, Post Falls, Idaho, concluded that nurse
practitioner Sholtz fell

below the

hospital to personally assess

by Sholtz

t0 address

the severity of

[R. pp.

Ms.

local standard of care

Fisk, based

on the

failure

by

failing to

g0

to the

of medications ordered

Ms. Fisk’s worsening symptoms, her coffee ground emesis,

symptoms — and

that Sholtz should

have contacted Dr. McDonald.

539 — 540]

D. Jennifer Orsua, nurse practitioner, Post Falls, Idaho,
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-10

concluded that nurse

been more thorough, asking more questions about

practitioner Sholtz should have

symptoms, should have contacted Dr. McDonald,

more information from

nurses, and failure t0 notify Dr.

had not been discharged.

[R. pp.

3.

McDonald and His Experts Said

Dr.

McDonald himself was

from NWSH

t0 Kootenai.

failing t0 inquire sufﬁciently for

critical

549

McDonald

et seq.]

Sholtz Fell Below the Standard.

of Jessica Sholtz’s decision not t0 transfer Ms. Fisk

t0 transfer,

Which Jessica Sholtz did not follow.

There was n0 reason Jessica Sholtz couldn’t have notiﬁed him, as he was “at
[R. 1593] Dr.

McDonald,

One 0f Dr. McDonald’s

t0 transfer.

4.

a

would have seen

[R. p.1617]

designated expert Witnesses was also critical 0f Jessica Sholtz. In

her designation, [R. p. 1609], nurse Rhonda Taylor, was

of care in her

[R. p. 1592].

home just having

in response t0 Interrogatories, [No. 28],

Ms. Fisk and followed the recommendation

morning hours of March

Ms. Fisk

He testiﬁed in deposition that he would have transferred, based mainly

0n a consultant’s recommendation

normal night.”

that

12, 2015.

critical

Nurse Taylor’s opinion was

failure t0 follow a consultation

recommendation

of the Sholtz’s actions in the early
that Sholtz fell

to transfer

below the standard

Ms. Fisk

t0 Kootenai.

Conclusion.

Jessica Sholtz provided substandard care under local standards.

statutorily responsible for that.

He

Dr.

McDonald

should be required to answer for Sholtz’s substandard care

is

at

trial.

C. Signiﬁcant Foundation was Presented Demonstrating Familiarity with the

Common-

Sense Standard 0f Care.

The standard of care applicable
that the nursing staff had

standard

is set

to the hospital is straight-forward

an obligation to observe, manage and

forth in the policies adopted
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by

the hospital, the

treat

and simple. The notion

Mrs. Fisk

is

universal.

Board of Nursing,

State

This

law and

the American Nurses Association (“ANA”) relied upon and followed by the nursing staff.
The failure to adequately care for Mrs. Fisk is recognized by the district court when it notes
that,“ There can be no doubt that they have suffered damage. There can be no doubt that the longer
emergency surgery was delayed, more of Margaret Fisk’s intestines were irreparably damaged.
Logic tells us that someone, or more than one person, waited too long to get Margaret Fisk into
that emergency surgery.” R. 2185. That “someone” were the people responsible for her care. The
district court found fault with those care providers and then denied the Fisks their opportunity to
present their case to a jury.
This Court now has a clear choice: 1) give the Fisks the remedy they deserve, which is a
trial; or 2) allow the defendants to escape liability based on a convoluted “how many angels can
dance on the head of a pin” interpretation of the local standards statute. These standards must be
applied in a common sense fashion allowing cases like this the opportunity to be weighed by the
finder of fact.
As it relates to the Hospital, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to produce
admissible evidence that at least one of their expert witnesses had actual knowledge of the
applicable standard of care. R. 1854. The court concluded that cases in Idaho tend to uniformly
require that the (1) the out of area expert consult with a local expert that the local standard has
been replaced by a national standard, or (2) the out of area expert to review deposition testimony
from a local specialist that testifies that the local standard has been replaced by a national standard.
R. 1863.
Based on that logic the district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ experts failed to lay an
adequate foundation for their opinion as required by Idaho Code §6-1013. The plaintiffs do not
quibble with the requirement that they must demonstrate that their experts have familiarity with
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the local standard of care. The standard of care is simply the care typically provided under the
circumstances by the relevant type of health care provider at the time and place of the negligent
act. Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 130, 75 P.3d 180, 184 (2003). Reviewing depositions and the
like is an accepted means to acquire knowledge of the local standard. Id. at 184
This Court in Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 384 P.3d 943, 947 (2016), held that
experts are not held to some formulaic process for familiarizing themselves with the standard of
care. The question the court must ask is whether the proposed expert’s grounds for claiming
knowledge of that standard would likely give rise to knowledge of the standard. Id. at 949. The
standard of care in Samples was “largely a matter of common sense” and “not complicated.” Id. at
949-50.
In opposition to the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment the plaintiffs provided the
Declarations of Dr. Kubiak, Suzanne Nebeker, Timothy F. Hawkins and Robert Uyeda, M.D. The
substance of what was provided is largely covered on pages 11-22 of the Appellants’ Brief. The
variety of information relied on by the experts must be viewed comprehensively. Medical
professionals in a community cannot adopt standards that are inferior to statewide standards.
Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 117-18, 254 P.3d 11, 18-19 (2011). It was recognized by
the Suhadolnik Court that the increase in communication, government regulation, development of
regional and national provider organizations, and the wide availability of medical information has
resulted in local standards not frequently varying from national standards.
In coming to their opinions the plaintiffs’ experts relied on a number of things in
familiarizing themselves with the local standard of care. Among those items reviewed were:
•

The standards of nursing care present in Idaho during the March 2015 timeframe.

•

The standard procedures adopted by the hospital to include the standards put forth by
the ANA.
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•

Idaho Statutes and IDAPA.

•

The Medical Record.

•

Jt. Commission Standards (Requirements associated with hospital accreditation.

•

Depositions.

•

Expert reports and declarations submitted by the defendants.

The requirements and policies set forth by the ANA and adopted by the hospital define the standard
of care. These standards were adopted by policy and according to the depositions of nursing staff
were required to be followed in the Post Falls area in March of 2015. Similarly, compliance with
the Idaho Board of nursing is required. The standard of care as it relates to the hospital is the
standard that was adopted through its own policy.
Mattox simply requires a showing that the expert is familiar with the standard of care and
a demonstration as to how they became familiar with it. Each of the items reviewed above are
completely acceptable in familiarizing an expert with the local standard of care. Nothing in the
language of §6-1012-13 precludes an expert, when forming their opinion, from relying on a
statewide standard of care that has been adopted by that profession’s governing board. Grover v.
Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105 (2002).
The plaintiffs’ experts educated themselves with evidence and information that has been
recognized by this court to be acceptable. First and foremost the hospital adopted a national
nursing standard of care. Those policies, procedures and rules define the standard of care for the
hospital. The Idaho Board of Nursing is governing board establishing state wide policies that must
be followed by the hospital.

The information gleaned from depositions completes this

comprehensive picture of what the standard of care was at that time and place.
Let us not forget that we are not dealing with a complicated standard of care. As noted in
Samples, sometimes the standard is largely a matter of common sense. The hospital failed to react
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to Mrs. Fisk’s changing condition. As she languished in pain the nursing staff failed to treat her
and ultimately failed to move her to a higher level of care as recommended by a physician.
As noted by the plaintiffs’ experts the applicable standard of care in March of 2015 would
have required the nursing staff to act quickly to treat Mrs. Fisk’s condition. To adopt the hospital’s
position, we must ignore the existence of Idaho statutes on nursing, national standards of the ANA,
the national standards created by the Joint Commission and CMS, the analysis of a distinguished
Idaho nurse and professor—Dr. Kubiak, the obviously brilliant nurse practitioner—Suzanne
Nebeker, and cast all this aside because we couldn’t produce a local health are provider to say the
obvious, that the hospital must comply with the guidelines of the profession.
D. The District Court Applied an Incorrect Standard to the Motion for Reconsideration.
As noted in the Appellants’ Brief, the district court erred by applying the good cause
standard of I.R.C.P. 59 and 60 to the Motion for Reconsideration. This error is not addressed by
the hospital. The hospital does not defend the district court’s application of those rules. Instead,
it argues that I.R.C.P. 11.2 does “not preclude” the use of a good cause standard when considering
evidence submitted with a motion for reconsideration. The rule doesn’t preclude a number of
different standards, but the rule as written does not impose such a standard.
The hospital provided no authority supporting the use of a “good cause” standard for the
consideration of new evidence. Instead, the hospital argues that this Court should create a new
standard to deter litigants from taking advantage of the system by seeking a second shot. The rule
and the case law suggest that seeking this relief is not about a second shot, rather it is about
ensuring that the district court has all the information it needs to make the correct decision. This
policy, with an aim toward ensuring a fair opportunity to be heard should be embraced by this
Court.
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The Appellants stand by their firm conviction that adequate foundation was provided to
the district court at the initial summary judgment. After review of the court’s decision, additional
foundation was sought—clarification provided—and a more complete foundational record was
created so that, in the interest of justice the district court would have everything it needed to make
its decision.
1. The Motion for Reconsideration Should have been Granted.
Contrary to the findings of the district court, the information and evidence presented in
those affidavits was fundamentally important in demonstrating familiarity with the local standard
of care. The district court chastised the Appellants for failing to address the I.R.CP 59 and 60
standard of good cause and then indicated that the new affidavits fail to present admissible
evidence reflecting knowledge of the standard of care. R. 2184, 2186.
In support of the Motion for Reconsideration the Appellants provided ample additional
information to the district court. The Declaration of Vernon Kubiak went into great deal setting
forth hospital rules and the ANA providing detailed examples as to how they define the local
standard of care. R. 1955. Within those examples he also provided specific deposition testimony
from hospital nurses further relied on in establishing the local standard of care.
In her second Declaration, Ms. Nebeker provided a great deal of additional information. R.
1941-1952. Not only does exhaustively set forth the information she relied on in educating herself
as to the local standard of care, she spoke to a local nurse about the prevailing standards in
existence at the time. (Please see Appellants’ Brief at 25-28). The Declaration of Timothy
Hawkins addressed his opinion further providing information to the court as to the relationship
between CMS, the Joint Commission, the state of Idaho and Norwest Specialty Hospital. R. 1972.
The Third Declaration and Response of Suzanne Nebeker provides additional information on the
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applicable standard of care. R. 2153-2166.
The district court’s decision is mixed. The Court found that the Appellants presented no
new evidence to support their motion to reconsider. It found that Nebeker’s new Declaration:
•

Did not provide the ANA guidelines for the Court to review to determine whether those
guidelines provide some cognizable standard applicable to this case.

•

Did not provide any testimony by Nurse Miller.

•

Did not provide the contents of communications she he had with Odom, Wagner and
Moore.

•

Provides no admissible evidence reflecting actual knowledge of the standard of care.
R. 2186

Similar analysis was applied to the new Declaration of Kubiak. The caselaw does require that the
Appellants demonstrate knowledge of the standard of care. The submitted declarations provided
the court with that information. In addition to the experts setting forth their knowledge of the
standard of care and how they became familiar with it the district court-imposed requirements
found nowhere in Idaho jurisprudence.
In providing the laundry list referenced above the court is now requiring more than just
testimony in a declaration. Nebeker cannot say that she is familiar with the standards set forth by
the ANA—according to the district court she now has to physically provide those standards to the
court for review. She cannot simply reference the testimony of Nurse Miller—she has to provide
the actual testimony for review. Though she summarized her communications with Odom,
Wagner and Moore—it was not enough for the Court. Throughout each of her Declarations she
continually provided an evidentiary basis reflecting knowledge of the standard of care. As it relates
to each and every Declaration submitted by the Appellants the court found unnecessary fault
applying a stringent standard of admissibility not in keeping with the applicable rules or the spirit
of the requirements under §6-1012-13.
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VII.

CONCLUSION
The Appellants

respectfully request that the Court reverse and

remand

the case for further

proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

18th

day of September 2019.
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